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THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND MONOPOLY*
EDwARD H. LEvitITHERE is a strong anti-monopoly tradition in this country. The
word monopoly like cartel has an evil sound. As Gouverneur
Morris wrote to Livingston in 1811, "the word 'monopoly' is of
dangerous efficiency .... it may turn the current of opinion against you."'
The Sherman Antitrust Act embodies this tradition against monopoly.
Yet concentration of economic control in the sense that a few companies
together control the major output of an industry is the standard pattern
of American business. The existence of a strong anti-monopoly tradition
and of great economic concentration represents a confusion in the anti-
monopoly tradition itself. We are not sure whether we are against monop-
oly or the abuses of monopoly. We do not know whether we want regu-
lated competition or regulated monopoly. We do not know whether we are
opposed to size or merely to unreasonably high prices. The confusion is
deep and is a part of the tradition.
The tradition has at least four parts to it.
It was the fear of exorbitant prices which led to the passage of penal
statutes against forestalling, regrating and engrossing.2 The strength of
the fear and the common-law heritage is indicated by the continued life in
these statutes in England after their repeal. "There was scarcely a family
in the realm that did not feel itself aggrieved by the oppression and ex-
* Given as a lecture Dec. 11, 1946, in the course on "Current Problems in Antitrust Law"
at the Practicing Law Institute in New York City.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; formerly Special Assistant to the
Attorney General and First Assistant in the Antitrust Division.
x Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization 481 (1946).
2 Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 3r
Harv. L. Rev. 246, 257 (i917).
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tortion which the abuses naturally caused. Iron, oil, vinegar, coal, lard,
starch, leather, glass could be bought only at exorbitant prices," Lord
Macaulay reminds us. 3 The high rates charged by monopolies were the
targets in this country of the Patrons of Husbandry and the populist
parties.4 The Republican party platform of i888 was'for legislation to
prevent undue charges and to prevent unjust gates. The Democrats were
against combinations which enrich the few by robbing the body of our
citizens.5
But the fear of monopoly was not limited to a fear of high prices alone.
The monopolizer, as opposed to the man who merely possessed a monop-
oly, was one who worked his abuses on the public. And the abuses included
high prices. But the monopolist and the monopolizer, when the monopoly
was state conferred, shared one thing in common; they worked the abuse
of denying access of the market to others. And so it has been frequently
urged that our heritage of an antipathy toward monopoly is really an
heritage against the government grant which by conferring a property
right in the exclusive possession of a field of business denied equality of
opportunity.6 The protest against monopoly was a protest 4gainst the
favorites of government. It is only by analogy, we are told, that the courts
have been able to reason from the illegality of the monopoly obtained by
the exclusive government grant, as in the Case of Monopolies, to "the
illegality of any control of the market no matter how secured." 7
Our heritage against monopoly then is a heritage against exorbitant
prices, unnaturally secured, and against the assertion of the exclusive
right to do business based on a grant of government. But to these must
be added also a belief in the rights of man.8 It is the right of every man to
be free of restrictions except those recognized by law. It is the right of
every man to engage in business and to seek his opportunity. It would be
too much to say that this recognition of the rights of man implied a recog-
nition of the merits of the free and competitive society. Governmental
price fixing in the colonies was well known and widely practiced. And the
right of every man to engage in business might include the right to be suc-
3 r Macaulay, History of England 67 (Lovell, New York); Naujoks, Monopoly and Re-
straint of Trade under the Sherman Act, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 386 (1928).
4 Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 Yale L.J. 42, 207
(1926).
'-Knauth, The Policy of the United States towards Industrial Monopoly 16-i7 (1913).
6 Mason, Mpnopoly in Law and Economics, 47 Yale L.J. 34,37 (1937).
7Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1166
(1932).
8 Holdsworth, Industrial Combinations and the Law in the Eighteenth Century, 18 Minn.
L. Rev. 369 (1934).
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cessful. This might include the right to emerge as a monopolist, albeit a
monopolist who is not a "monopolizer" 9 in that he does not abuse his
earned position by charging exorbitant rates.
"It is remarkable," Mr. Chief Justice White was later to say with some
satisfaction in the Standard Oil case, "that nowhere at common law can
there be found a prohibition against the creation of monopoly by an in-
dividual ..... After all, this was but an instinctive recognition of the
truisms that the course of trade could not be made free by obstructing it,
and that an individual's right to trade could not be protected by destroy-
ing such right."' Somewhat along the same line, Mr. Justice Holmes was
also to declare, presumably as a decisive step in a dissenting opinion, "I do
not expect to hear it maintained that Mr. Morgan could be sent to prison
for buying as many shares as he liked of the Great Northern and the
Northern Pacific .... ."" One boast of the American tradition, as Mr.
Kales noted somewhat anxiously, although hopefully, was "there is no
limit under the American law to which a business may not independently
grow.""
The right of every man to engage in business free of restrictions not
imposed by law, the necessity to guard against exorbitant prices, and op-
position to governmental grants to favorites-these are the first themes
of the Anglo-American tradition against monopolies. The colonies de-
veloped an additional theme and one always popular. They were opposed
to other people's monopolies and restrictions on trade imposed upon them
from afar. In later days the farmers of the middle west would rally against
the monopolistic practices of the "eastern interests"; the west and the
south would protest against their colonization by the trading companies
of the north, and the country as a whole could be united against foreign
monopolies, particularly German cartels. This theme began early. It was
present at the Boston tea party. It was present in our first negotiations
with the British after independence was secured. The control of commerce
by the federal government was considered to be particularly useful as a
means to deal with British monopolistic practices. So opposed were we to
British monopolies that we were willing to counterattack with our own if
necessary.' 3 The roots of the Webb-Pomerene Act are indeed deep. '
9 Adler, op. cit. supra note 2, at 26x; Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust
Act, io Col. L. Rev. 687, 695 (i91o).
1 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. , 55-56 (ixox).
"z Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 409 (1904).
12 Kales, Good and Bad Trusts, 3o Harv. L. Rev. 830, 852 (1917), quoting the district court
opinion in the International Harvester case.
13 Jones, op. cit. supra note 4, at 207,209.
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So strong was the tradition against monopoly in, this country in the
early days, so efficient and unpleasant the word, that not only were pro-
hibitions against it adopted in early state constitutions, but Thomas Jef-
ferson writing from Paris protested against the failure to include an ex-
plicit provision outlawing the evil in the federal constitution.' 4 It would
be an upderstatement to say this tradition is still with us. "During the
past half century the United States has developed a tradition in opposi-
tion to private monopolies. The Sherman and Clayton Acts have become
as much a part of the American way of life as the due process clause of the
Constitution," President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Hull on
September 6, 1944. Courts today can and do repeat by rote the assurance
that Congress has decreed that "competition, not combination, should be
the law of trade."' S And it has become traditional, also, to greet victories
or defeats on the battlefield of the Sherman Act with a fervor only slightly
less than hysterical. Thus we are told that the effect of a decision of the
Supreme Court in a Sherman Act case is as great in its effect upon the wel-
fare of our country "as would be the results of decisive battles in a great
war."' 6 The tradition in this country against monopoly is strong.
But it is confused. And those who wish to monopolize can make use of
that confusion.
The traditional way to make use of that confusion by those who wish
to monopolize is to point out that every property right is in some sense a
monopoly right.' 7 The successful competitor achieves greater property
rights. He may in fact become the sole occupier of the field. But this is be-
cause he has been a successful competitor. If it is said that he is 'a monopo-
list then every act of successful competition is an act of monopoly. So runs
the argument. Our tradition does not make him a monopolist because he
holds no exclusive grant from the king. If others may still enter the field,
'4 2 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1853): Letter to James Madison (Paris, Dec. 20,
1787), at 329; Letter to A. Donald (Paris, Feb. 7, 1788), at 355; Letter to James Madison
(July 31, 1788), at 445: "The saying there shall be no monopolies, lessens the incitements to
ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of fourteen
years; but the benefit of even limited monopolies is too doubtful, to be opposed to that of
their general suppression." 3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson ioo (1853), Letter to James
Madison (Paris, Aug. 28, 1789): ...... the following alterations and additions would have
pleased me.... Article 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own production in
literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding - years, but for
no longer term, and for no other purpose."
S National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. iI5, 129 (I9O5); United States v. Crescent
Amusement'Co., 323 U.S. 173, 87 (I944).
16 Levy, A Contrast between the Antitrust Laws of Foreign Countries and of the United
States, 167 Annals 125 (x930), quoting Mr. Justice Clarke; also in Levy, The Sherman Act
Is Outworn, It Should Be Amended, 13 Va. L. Rev. 597 (1927).
"7 Fetter, The Masquerade of Monopoly 33 (1931).
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or, better yet, if there are a few left, he has no monopoly. All that he has
done is to assert the right of man to the freedom of competition. It is only if
he has abused this privilege by conduct outside the normal methods of busi-
ness or by charging exorbitant prices that we will regard him as a monop-
olist.
For the greater part of its history, the Sherman Act has as a practical
matter adhered to the abuse theory when applied to closely knit combina-
tion or monopoly cases. As a theoretical matter this is not strictly true.
It is not true because the cases themselves are not clear. It is also not true
because it is quite possible to point to dramatic deviations from the abuse
theory. For example the Northern Securities case does not go on the abuse
theory.18 It appears to go on the theory that a combination of competing
units is bad in itself. But the railroad cases really are in a class by them-
selves.' 9 They are public utility cases.2 0 The units were tangibly immense.
And there was a recognition that the units themselves were monopolistic.21
This might have led the court to the conclusion that the Sherman Act did
not apply or if it did apply then it did so with greater leniency than else-
where.- But the contrary was the result. Possibly the feeling was that it is
better not to add one monopoly to another. The stricter application of the
Sherman Act to railroads, which is an undoubted fact, finds an analogy
today in the treatment of patents under the Sherman Act, or, more accu-
rately, the general law2 3 And the basis for the treatment is probably the
same-a franchise has been given; it is necessarily monopolistic; an at-
tempt to extend the franchise will be carefully scrutinized.
In describing the effect of Supreme Court cases in Sherman Act monop-
oly suits, it is important to remember that there are not many such opin-
1S Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
'9 Ibid.; United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); United States
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (x912); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (I912);
United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
254 U.S. 255 (1920); United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922).
2o See the argument for the United States in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S.
505, 556-57 (W898); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6, 114 (19W1). See,
also, Kales, op. cit. supra note 12, at 830-33; Reuschlein, Aluminum and Monopoly: A Phase
of an Unsolved Problem, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 509, 516 (i939).
" See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 363 (i9o4): "It must also be remembered that under present conditions a
single railroad is, if not a legal, largely a practical, monopoly, and the arrangement by which
the control of these two competing roads was merged in a single corporation broadens and
extends such monopoly." Cf. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 6i, 83 (1912).
"Application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to Holding Companies Organized by
Parent Railroad Corporations, 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 652, 654 (2930).
'3 Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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ions, that the cases take a considerable amount of preparation before they
can be brought, and that within the practical limitations of even a wel
financed staff, which the Antitrust Division normally has not had, only
a very few cases could be brought in any event. The opinions of the Su-
preme Court in this field then have an unusual importance since it is their
interpretation by business men and by the administration which may de-
termine the trend in American industry to the extent that any law can do
so. Even if the interpretation is wrong, it will still determine the trend.
Dictum is very important in the monopoly cases.
It is for this reason that it is probably accurate to say that as a practical
matter for most of its history the Sherman Act has adhered to the abuse
theory. The Standard Oil,2 4 American Tobacco,'5 and United States Steel6
cases mark the direction. And this is so even though it is not dear what
theory the court thought it adopted in any one of the cases.
It is probably unfortunate that the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases were such good prosecution cases. The presence of enormous abuses
in both made it unnecessary for the court to make up its mind about the
basis of the Sherman Act. There were huge profits, espionage, local price
cutting and rebates in the Standard Oil case. 27 In the tobacco case, the
United States could argue, "if duress, and wicked and unfair methods are
essential, they all appear."' The truth is, of course, that in most monop-
oly cases, if the court has a mind to do so, it can find abuses. As Mr.
Brandeis stated in testifying before a Senate committee in 1912, he had
not dealt with a monopoly sitflation where there were not also abuses.
2 9
24 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. I (IgiI).
25 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. Io6 (9ig1).
26 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
27 Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowaL. Rev. 175, 214-16 (1936).
28 Argument for the United States in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
io6, i12 (1g1).
29 1 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 62nd Cong. ist Sess.,
at ix67 (1912):
"SF14ATOR Culmmms: Do you believe that a corporation can be so offensive to the anti-
trust law on account of its size, even though it does not employ any of the vicious or unjust
practices that have been characteristic of some of the trusts of which you have spoken?
"Mr. BRANIEis: I should think it certainly might if it originated in combination.
"SENAToP CumMs: Ought there not, therefore, be some instrumentality of the law that
would determine how large a corporation should become or be, even before it may be finally
condemned through a prosecution against it under the antitrust law?
"MR. BRANDEIs: I am inclined to think yes. Perhaps if I might-
"SaNAron Cummrs: Do not confine yourself to categorical answers, but give us your views
upon the subject that may be contained in the question.
"MR. BRANDEis: I thank you. I have had no belief that up to the present time a question
had arisen to any corporation in that narrow form in which you put it; that is, each one of the
large corporations I have had to deal with have been objectionable on grounds other than size
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It would have been a simple matter in view of the Gary dinners and the
use of the basing point system, for example, for the court to have found
abuses in the United States Steel case. 30
The United States Steel case and the International Harvester case3' gave
currency to the doctrine that size is no offense under the Sherman Act.
That was not precisely what the Court said in either case. In both in-
stances it was careful to use the word "mere. ' ' 32 This however did not help
clarify any precise meaiiing of the decisions. In the United States Steel
case, possibly the trouble was that the size was not sufficiently big, for the
corporation had less than 5o per cent of the steel market in general when
the case was decided. The Court was impressed by the need the corpora-
tion felt to sit down with its competitors to determine prices. It made of
such an abuse the proof of a lack of power. So one could argue that the
Steel case is at least cofisistent with the proposition that the application
of the act depends not on abuses but on either the existence or the asser-
tion of the power to dominate. The effect of the decision was catastrophic,
however, if one were interested in preventing the merger and concentra-
tion movement in the United States. Nor did the International Harvester
case help, although that case was peculiar in that it could be said that the
company had done what it said it would and should not be held to higher
standards. Be that as it may, the Harvester case underlined the insuffi-
ciency of size as any violation, and raised the permissible percentage figure
to 64 per cent.
It must be admitted also that to say that the Steel and Harvester cases
affixed the abuse theory on the Sherman Act does not dispose of problems
of size or' percentages of control. Acts which might otherwise constitute
merely. I have considered and do consider that the proposition that mere bigness cannot be an
offense against society is false, because I believe that our society, which rests upon democracy,
cannot endure under such conditions. Something approaching equality is essential. You may
have an organization in the community which is so powerful that in a particular branch of the
trade it may dominate by mere size. Although the individual practices may be according to
rules, it may be, nevertheless, a menace to the community; and I may add further that, in
my opinion, it was bad legislation which removed all limits to the size of corporations, as we
did from io to 2o years ago."
3* United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (192o).
31 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
32 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920): "But we must
adhere to the law, and the law does not make mere size an offense or the existence of
unexerted power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to its prohibition
of them and its power to repress or punish them. It does not compel competition nor require
all that is possible." United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927):
"The law, however, does not make the mere size of a corporation, however impressive, or the
existence of unexerted power on its part, an offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct
in the exercise of its power."
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abuses in the presence of great size or percentage of control might appear
more innocuous without size or a high percentage. Thus coercive activ-
ities or price fixing might well depend for their illegality on market con-
trol. For example, the percentage of control was undoubtedly a factor in
the Standard Co. v. Magrane Houston Co. case33 and the Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild.34 In the presence of the Appalachian Coals case,35 it would
be a brave person indeed who would have trien said that market control
was unimportant. The abuse theory which the Steel and Harvester cases
fashioned onto the act was really the notion that only alarming and un-
gentlemanly conduct-involving, for example, the use of slander concern-
ing one's competitors, an insistence upon continued growth through pice
wars and resulting acquisitions, and in general the fist with the glove held
in the other hand for the court to see-would be sufficient to invoke the
Sherman Act against the crime of monopolizing. The Supreme Court did
much in the Steel case to soothe the fears of the bar and to weaken the
work which lower courts had been attempting to do in such cases as Corn
Products36 and Eastman Kodak.Y7
It would be unfair to place the whole blame for economic concentration
in this country on the Supreme Court. All that we can say is that neither
the Sherman Act nor the Supreme Court did much to stop the trend.
II
More than ten years ago, Mr. Berle told us that we should recognize
that "we have got concentration, whether we like it or not." 35 He spoke
of it as a &oncentration "unmatched in history, with the single exception
of the Communist system in Russia." In his dissenting opinion in Liggett
v. Lee, Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke of this concentration as" the negation of
33 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
34 Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
3s Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (x933).
36 United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (D.C.N.Y., 1916). The
opinion by Judge Learned Hand foreshadows the Alcoa opinion. "The opinions of the Supreme
Court certainly seem to indicate that it is the power and not its exercise which is the test."
Ibid., at ioxi. "A national policy would be intelligible which looked only at the price and
service to the consumer, disregarding the misfortunes of the producer altogether. Yet even then
the consumer's interest in the long run is quite different from an immediate fall in prices, even
if the quality of the service is maintained. The very defendanits allege that a trade war is bad
in the end for consumers, and no doubt they are right. If, therefore, 'public prejudice' be the
test, it by no means follows that it is to be judged alone by price and quality. A given organiza-
tion of industry may be thought to react to the public prejudice, regardless of its directly
observable results." Ibid., at 1oi-i.
37 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (D.C. N.Y., 1915).
39 Berle in Handler, The Federal Antitrust Laws I59 (1932).
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industrial democracy." 39 "The typical business corporation of the last
century, owned by a small group of individuals, managed by their owners,
and limited in size by their personal wealth," he wrote, "is being sup-
planted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of
investors are subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control
of a few men. Ownership has been separated from control; and this separa-
tion has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to curb the
misuse of wealth and power. And as ownership of the shares is becoming
increasingly dispersed, the power which formerly accompanied ownership
is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. The changes
thereby wrought in the lives of the workers, of the owners and of the gen-
eral public are so fundamental and far-reaching as to lead .... scholars
to compare the evolving 'corporate system' with the feudal system; and
to lead other men of insight and experience to assert that this 'master in-
stitution of civilized life' is committing it to the rule of a plutocracy. ' 40
In the same vein, Senator O'Mahoney has seized upon an advertise-
ment of the Union Oil Co. of California which announces that "America's
Fifth Freedom is Free Enterprise" and then goes on to show that of its
I944 net profits of $8,932,944, each stockholder would have, if he could
have a share of it, $277.18, because the Union Oil Company is owned not
by one man or two but by 32,227 individual Americans. This "is not indi-
vidual free enterprise at all," the Senator said. "It is a collective enter-
prise, with a lot of stockholders and a lot of workers. Such enterprises are
under the direction of managers, expert managers in business, not the
owners." 4' The Senator sounded the theme of the awful and momentous
choice. He pointed out that" collectivism in business leads directly to col-
lectivism in government." He said his message to the House committee
studying the problem was "a very simple one. It is this: You cannot hope
to prevent the steady trend toward concentrated government unless you
prevent the steady trend toward concentrated economic power. You can-
not hope to decentralize government through the States and local com-
munities if you do not undertake to preserve free enterprise in the States
and in the local communities. The two things are absolutely tied together;
and the history of the last 5o years has been the history of the steady loss
"to the Government at Washington of political power by the people in the
39 288 U.S. 517, 566 (i933).
40 Ibid., at 565.
41 Hearings on H.R. 2357 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 7 9 th Cong. ist
Sess., at 19 (1945).
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States, because we have permitted the loss of economic power to economic
concentrations of the kind I have been describing. If we permit ourselves
to lose our economic independence, the loss of local political power is in-
evitable.42
The Senator, however, thought we still had a choice. He thought so even
though he stated that concentration in this country had reached the point
where "less than one and one-half per cent of all the industrial employers
in the United States employ about fifty-five per cent of all the industrial
workers."43'He thought so even though a chart which he presented to the
committee showed that the gross revenues of some private corporate gi-
ants were greater than the revenues of any state or city in this country-
a fact which was noted sixteen years ago by President Hoover's Commit-
tee on Social Trends, but then it was only true of four private corporations
and today it is true of six, with the revenues larger. 44
It is of course difficult to judge or evaluate the effect of the amount of
economic concentration in American industry today. We seem to have
had economic concentration with us since the Civil War. The charge was
made in 1884 that all the industries of the country were governed by com-
binations. 45 The debates on the Sherman Act brought forth the mention
42 Tbid., at 9.
43 1bid., at 12-13.
44 Senator 0'Mahoney referred to the trend as a "trend toward centralism" which is a more
appropriate term than concentration. Ibid., at zo. The charts introduced show the following:
COMPARISON OF CERTAIN CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND CITIES WITH
RESPECT TO GROSS REVENUES AND NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, 1930
Corp. or Political Gross Employ- Corp. or Political Gross Employ-
Unit Revenues-,, ees Unit Revenues,3 ees'
U.S. Steel Corp ......... $1,20,377,367 211,055 Detroit .............. $154,69,790 i9,436
Great A.&P. Tea Co..... 1,053,692,882 40,000 Los Angeles ........... 52,166,523 16,975
General Motors Corp... 996,687,332 172,938 Philadelphia............33,522,058 21,997
Pa. R.R. System ......... 6x6,638,65o x66,607 Californa............. 226,919,827 17,495
New York City .......... 6xx,571,726 86,5og New Jersey........... 91,o68,o9o 8,385
Standard Oil Co. ofnd 465,752,175 44,520 Boston.............. 79,095,089 2o,606
General Elec. Co..........396,242,632 78,380 Ohio....: . .. 78,527,225 6,426
Am. Telephone & Tele- Illinois............... 69,90o,391 13,134
graph Co ............. 292,or4,871 324,343 North Carolina......... 41,401,317 6,So6
New York State ......... 272,940,372 28,798 Maryland ............. 28,65,36 6,962
Chicago ............... 24,748,819 42,983 Maine.................8,024,202 2,500
, Corporation gross revenues include income from all sources for the year 1930. Figures from annual reports or
from Standard Corporation Records. State figures are revenue receipts for 1929 and are from U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Financial Statistics of States. City figures are revenue receipts for t928 and are from U.S. Bureau of he
Census, Financial Statistics of Cities.
Figures on municipal and State employees are for 1930 with the exception of the States of New York and New
Jersey, which are for 1928. The figures are not necessarily comparable because some of the items include only
those in the classified service; some include educational employees and others do not. -'
These figures include a part of county receipts and receipts of special districts as allocated by the Bureau of
te Census.
[Footnote continued on following page]
4S Knauth, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13, quoting Henry D. Lloyd.
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of a variety of trusts or monopolies-most of which in one form or another
we still have with us today. And it was against this "alarming concentra-
tion of control" 46 and monopoly that the statute was primarily aimed. It
is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Justice Brandeis has told us, that today we
accept with resignation, if not with applause, those "evils attendant upon
the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism" which during
the greater part of our history we did not think "were the inescapable
price of civilized life." 47 The Sherman Act was passed at a time when it
was felt that a new charter of freedom was required-freedom from the
"insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly
when held by corporations." 48 The words of Mr. Justice Harlan in the
[Continuation of footnote 441
COMPARISON OF CERTAIN CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND CITIES-GROSS
REVENUES AND NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, 1942
Rank in
Rink in 1942 Corporation or Political Unit Gross Revenues Employees 928-3oGross Revenues Gross
Revenues
(i) ........... General Motors Corp. $2,250,548,859 314,144 3
,2)- United States Steel x,862,951,692 335,866
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 1,469,263,216 327,107
4) ........Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 1,378,1247,240.......... (2)
5) ........ General Electric Co. 913,656,277 139,939 (7)(6) ............ Pennsylvania R. R. System 838,474,622 x51,6o4 (4)
(7) ............ New York State 720,306,000 55,873 (9)
(8) ............ New York City 724,653,000 132,975' (S)
(9) ............ Calornia 517,261,ooo 29,00' (14)
o)... . Standard Oil of Indiana 464,558,256 ................ (6)
11) ... .. Illinois 368,572,000 20,999 (z)
12) ............ Ohio 358,380,000 20,2773 (17)
3) . .... New ersy 2o2,685,ooo 13,898 (is)
14). . North Carolina 232,662,000 4,626 (1g)
is). Chicago 114,763,ooo 31,318' (io)
x6)..Detroit Y04,981,000 23,758' ('x)
17) ............ Philadelphia 8r,405,000 29,699 13)
18) ............ Boston 77,620,000 12,6o67 (16)
I Maryland 76,887,000 9,253 (20)
(20):....... . Maine 40,342,000 6,16' (22)
(2) ............ Los Angeles 39,832,000 19,070" (12)
- General government, xoo,626; public-service enterprises, 32,349.
General government, 28,486; pubic-service enterprises, 524.
General government, 18,928; publc-service enterprises, 1,349.
4 General government, 27,807; public-service enterprises, 3,509.
s General government, x6,629; public-service enterprises, 7,129.
6 General government, x8,696; public-service enterprises, ,oo3.
7 General government, 12,075; public-service enterprises, 532.
8 General government, 9,176; public-service enterprises, 77.
9 General government, 5,940; public-service enterprises, 256.
"- General government, 1o,997; publsc-service enterprises, 8,073.
Notes on public employment: Figures exclude schools, work relief, and contract-work employment. Unless
otherwise indicated, employment total relates to general government only.
Source: Standard and Poor's corporation records; and 'publications of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Ibid., at io.
46 Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 32 Col. L. Rev. 179, 18o (1932).
47 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933). 48 Ibid., at 54().
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Standard Oil case still carry a considerable amount of eloquence to recre-
ate for us the period.49
The trend appears to be toward greater concentration. The standard
pattern for American industry today is control by three, four or five cor-
porations. To be sure there is some movement away from one-company
domination. In 1904, twenty-six trusts "controlled eighty per cent or
more of the production in their respective fields. And there were at least
eight concerns-the American Can Co., the American Sugar Refining
Co., the American Tobacco Co:, the Corn Products Co., the International
Harvester Co., the National Cash Register Co., the Standard Oil Co., and
the United Shoe Machinery Co.-that controlled at one time or another,
90 per cent or more of the output of some or all of their respective prod-
ucts.' 5 Control is less often found in one company alone today, although
it is still the case in nickel, and until recently was true for railroad sleeping
cars and the production of aluminum. The Sherman Act itself can at
least claim the credit for setting up the domination of the few as a sub-
stitute for the domination of the one in a number of industries, and pro-
duction for war has given impetus in this direction.
The trend is not new, nor is it only lately observed. Studies by Berle
and Means,"' by the Temporary National Economic Committee,5' the
Twentieth Century Fund,3 the National Resources Committee,54 and the
Smaller War Plants .Corporationss have indicated the trend in a number
of ways. Figures as to percentage of assets controlled, income received
and workers employed show the direction.
In i9o9, the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations owned one-third of
49 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911). "All who recall
the condition of the country in 18go will remember that there was everywhere, among the
people generally, a deep feeling of unrest. The Nation had been rid of human slavery-
fortunately, as all now feel-but the conviction was universal that the country was in real
danger from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people, namely,
the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and
corporations controlling, for their own profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business of
the country, including the production and sale of the necessaries of life."
so Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21, at 65
(1940).
s, Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1936).
52 Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21 (1940);
The Structure of Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 27 (1941); The Distribution of Ownership
in the Two Hundred Largest Non-Financial Corporations, TNEC Monograph No. 29 (1940).
53 Twentieth Century Fund, Big Business, Its Growth and Its Place (i937).
s4 National Resources Comm., The Structure of the American Economy (x939).
ss Economic Concentration and World War II, Report of the Smaller War Plants Corpora-
tion to the Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, Sen. Comm.
Print No. 6, 7 9 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946).
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the nonfinancial corporation assets. By 1929, this had increased to between
48 per cent and 50 per cent.,6 It was estimated in 1933 "that the relative
rate of growth maintained by the larger and smaller concerns from i9o9 to
1929, if continued for another twenty years, would place 70 per cent of
the Nation's corporate wealth in the hands of the 200 largest in i950."s7
By 1939, the share of the 200 largest had increased to 57 per cent. ss
In 1926, 316 large manufacturing corporations held 35 per cent of the
working capital of manufacturing corporations; by 1938 this percentage
had risen to 47 per cent.5 9
If percentage of the total net income of nonfinancial corporations is
taken as the measure, the trend is the same. The percentage of the total
net income of all nonfinancial corporations earned by the 200 largest in-
creased from 33 per cent in 1930 to 43 per cent in 1939.60 That received by
the upper 5 per cent of the companies went from 78.9 per cent in 1918 to
84.5 per cent in 1942.1 If the income of manufacturing companies alone
is observed, the increase in the percentage of the total amount received by
the larger manufacturing companies having at least five million annual
net income increased from 34 per cent in 1918 to almost 51 per cent in
1942. At the same time the percentage for those firms receiving less than
$250,ooo annual net incomes went down from 23.4 per cent to 11.6 per
cent.
62
Employment figures are likewise indicative. In 19o9 plants employing
iooo or more employees employed i5 per cent of all manufacturing wage
earners. By 1919 this had risen to 26 per cent.6 3 By 1944, 31 per cent of the
total were employed by firms with io,ooo or more employees-62 per
cent by firms with 500 or more employees. 64 In i909 metal products estab-
lishments employing iooo or more wage earners accounted for 21.3 per
cent; the proportion increased to approximately 4o per cent in i919 and
went to 64 per cent during the last war.4 There has been a "steady and
continuous decline in the relative importance of the self-employed mem-
s
6 Ibid., at 6; Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21,
at 299--300 (1940).
S7 Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21, at 299
(1940), citing Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 4o (I936).
ss Note 5o supra, at 299-300.
s9 Economic Concentration and World War I1, Report of the Smaller War Plants Corpora-
tion to the Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business 6, Sen. Comm.
Print No. 6, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946).
do Ibid. 63 Ibid.
6, Ibid., at 8. 64 Ibid., at.25.
62 Ibid. 65 Ibid., at ii.
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bers of the working community" from approximately 37 per cent in i88o,
to 30 per cent in igoo, to 23.5 per cent in 1920, to 19 per cent in 1939.6
The trend can be seen also by the increase in domination in two key
industries by a few firms. The three largest producers of automobiles ac-
counted for 42 per cent of the total output in 19o9. In 1938, they account-
ed for 9o per cent. In 188o, the four largest producers in the iron and steel
industry owned 25 per cent of the rolling mill capacity. At the end of
World War I, they held 55 per cent; by 1938 the percentage had risen to
64 per cent.67 The increase in the percentage of control in each case is
much more meaningful, of course, because of the enormous increase in
capacity output and value of both the automobile and the iron and steel
industries during this period.
As an overall matter, the war increased the amount of concentration.
The award of prime contracts to the largest corporations, liberal tax pro-
visions, and the fact that the greatest increase in the economy had to occur
in the manufacturing industries where concentration is almost the set
pattern-made this result inevitable. It is estimated that during the war
one-half million small retail, service and construction firms disappeared."8
The records of the War Production Board show that approximately 75
per cent of all prime war contracts were handled by 1oo corporations.
69
From June, 194o through September, 1944, prime war contract awards
amounting to 175 billion dollars were made to 18,539 corporations. Over
one-hal in value of the contracts went to 33 corporations, each of which
received awards totalling one billion or more. General Motors, largest
producer in the most highly concentrated industry, received the greatest
amount given to any one company.70 At least the temporary effect on the
concentration trend can be seen in that the 250 largest manufacturing
corporations which owned in 1939, 65 per cent of the country's productive
facilities operated during the war 79 per cent of all new privately operated
plant f~cillties built with government funds (and as to which they fre-
4uently held options to purchase), and in September of 1944 held 78 per
cent of the active prime war supply contracts. To the 25.9 billion dollars
of capital assets held by them in 1939, they had added 3.7 billions in pri-
vately financed facilities and they were in addition operating 8.9 of the
11.5 billion dollars of federally financed facilities.7'
66Ibid., at x4. 67 Ibid., at ii.
68 Ibid., at 27.
69 Hearings on H.R. 2357 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. ist
Sess., at 6 ('945).
70 Note 59 supra, at 30. 71 Note 59 supra, at 21-54.
THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND MONOPOLY
The pattern which has been established is the control over an industry
by a few corporations. In 6o per cent of the census-grouped manufacturing
industries, the largest four companies contributed more than one-third
of the value product of the industry.72 "More than 57 per cent of the total
value of manufactured products was produced under conditions where the
four largest producers of each product turned out over 5o per cent of the
total United States output."7a "Among the 275 categories included in the
Census of Manufacturers for 1935, there were 54 in which the four largest
firms produced more than two-thirds, by value, of the total supply. '74 It
"appears that two-fifths to one-half of the goods covered by the census are
made in fields where four concerns controlled three-fourths or more of the
supply.;'75
The extent of the pattern of control by a few is indicated by percentage
of production or ownership figures for some of the industries.
Eight companies have produced and distributed 8o to 90 per cent of the
feature films, and produced, distributed and exhibited 65 per cent of all
the motion pictures shown in the United States. Seven companies pro-
duced 90 per cent of the nation's output of matches. The five largest pro-
ducers of cement-an industry in which there were 75 companies in 1938
operating 162 mills, produced nearly 40 per cent of the total output.
Four companies in some recent year have accounted for the entire out-
put of inlaid linoleum, watt-hour meters, rubber combs, borax, epsom
salt, citric acid, tartaric acid, oxalic acid, calcium carbide, flake calcium
chloride, corn binders, and sewing machines. Four firms have accounted
for 99 per cent of the potash sold in the United States, 95 per cent of type-
writers, 92 per cent of chewing gum, 84 per cent of marble, 8o.9 per cent
of rubber tires and tubes, 8o per cent of gypsum, 78 per cent of copper, 79
per cent of oleomargarine, approximately 75 per cent of soap and approxi-
mately 75 per cent of 21 among 41 drugs and medicines, 68 per cent of coke
oven products, 74 per cent of rayon, 65 per cent of mechanical refriger-
ators, 64 per cent of iron ore, 63 per cent of asphalt, 62 per cent of steel in-
got capacity, 6o per cent of cane sugar, shortenings, beet sugar, cereals,
chocolate, cocoa, 55 per cent of vacuum cleaners, more than 50 per cent of
baking powder and distilled liquors, approximately 50 per" cent of home
radios, 4o per cent of flavoring extracts, condensed and evaporated milk,
malt, rectified and blended liquors. Four companies accounted for" 66 per
'2Note 59 supra, at 55. 73 Note 54 supra, at xx.
74Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21, at x15(1940).
7s Ibid., at 116.
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cent of the slaughter of meat animals, killed 52 per cent of the hogs, 67 per
cent of the cattle, 71 per cent of the calves, and 85 per cent of the sheep,
lambs,.and goats, and sold 43 per cent of the pork, 52 per cent of the lard,
58 per cent of the beef, 59 per cent of the cured pork, and 70 per cent of
the veal." 76
Three companies will probably in the future account for the total
aluminum supply. Three companies in some recent year have accounted
for 97 per cent of snuff, 90 per cent of household cotton thread, 87 per cent
of gypsum board, 86 per cent of automobiles, 8o per cent of cigarettes, 78
per cent of copper, 75 per cent of window glass, 75 per cent of ophthalmic
lenses, 74 per cent of the, biscuits and crackers, 70 per cent of cast iron
enamel ware and vitreous china ware, almost 70 per cent of electric ranges,
69 per cent of copper, 68 per cent of lead, 63 per cent of the national out-
put of chemicals, 63 per cent of cheese, 6o per cent of the nation's total
semi-ing9t capacity, 55 per cent of clinical thermometers, and 44 per cent
of canned milk.
Two companies in some recent year accounted for ioo per cent of elec-
trically driven tabulator machines, ioo per cent of railroad air brakes, 95
per cent of plate glass, 90 per cent of American supply of borates, 9o per
cent of sulphur, 90 per cent of compressed oxygen and acetylene to indus-
trial consumers, 89 per cent of the domestic capacity for the production of
synthetic nitrogen, 83 per cent of cans, 8o per cent of locomotives, 8o per
cent of distribution and power transformers, 8o per cent of tungsten fila-
ment lamps, 70 per cent of milk bottles, 70 per cent of electric motors, 64
per cent of tire cord fabric, 63 per cent of ophthalmic lenses, 63 per cent of
farm machinery, 6o per cent of dyestuffs, 56 per cent of glass containers,
55 per cent of steel industry's assets, 51 per cent of copper, and 47 per cent
of beef products.
And, of course, in some industries there still is control by one company,
as is the case with molybdenum, heat resisting ware, nickel, and shoe
machinery.
As if our present concentration of industry were not sufficiently great,
it is probable that we now have with us the third great merger' movement.
In the last quarter of 1945 mergers and acquisitions reached the highest
level since 1931.77 It is natural that this should occur if only because of
76 Ibid., at 115.
71 Note 59 supra, at 62; Johnson, Monopoly on the March Again, The American Mercury
65i (Dec., 1946): "Preliminary studies by the Department of Commerce indicate that the
rate is still rising: mergers reported during the first half of i946 indicate a total for this year
of more than 450." Unofficial and preliminary figures indicate that the merger rate for the
first half of 1946 was twice that for the first half of 1945, despite a drop in the first quarter
of 1946, and that the rate for the third quarter of 1946 was higher than at any time since 1930.
THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND MONOPOLY
the liquidity made possible by war profits and the opportunities for read-
justment and expansion this makes possible.
The first great merger movement occurred shortly after the passage of
the Sherman Act, largely between 1898 to 1903. That period saw the be-
ginnings of International Silver, International Paper, American Linseed,
United Shoe Machinery, Standard Sanitary, American Snuff, Internation-
al Salt, American Can, Eastman Kodak, International Harvester, Corn
Products, International Nickel, and E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder
Co. 78 It saw the formation of the United States Steel Corporation. The
stock market crash of 1903 and the depression of 1907 brought this first
movement to an end. But before it was terminated, twenty-six corpora-
tions controlled 8o per cent or more of the production in their respective
fields, and seventy-eight controlled 5o per cent or more.79
The second great merger movement occurred from 1925 to 1929 al-
though it undoubtedly began in i919 directly after the first world war and
was only temporarily halted by the early postwar depression in 1921. The
analogy to the present period is tempting. More than 1,238 consolidations
took place resulting in the disappearance of approximately 7ooo compa-
nies.O Iron and steel and the machinery industries accounted for about
one-fifth of the mergers. Control over dairies, cheese and bakeries was
established. The motion picture industry began to assume its modern
cartelized form.8 Mr. Robert Marx wrote in the Cincinnati Law Review
in 1928, "This is the day of big business. Steel mergers, oil mergers, tele-
phone mergers, railroad mergers, radio combinations, coal combinations,
automobile combinations, chain stores, all evidence the new found eco-
nomic advantage of mass purchasing, mass selling, and mass manufac-
ture."8  It was the era of co-operation, sanctioned by the Supreme Court,
in the United States Steel Corporation case. Co-operation supplanted the
era of regulation sanctified by Standard Oil and American Tobacco, which
in turn had supplanted competition, required by the Addyston Pipe and
Northern Securities cases. Co-operation made public interest the true test,
"and the proper application of that test will enable American business,
labor and agriculture to reap the advantages of anew economic freedom."' 3
78 The Structure of Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 27, at 231 (I941).
79 Note 59 supra, at 4.
8o Handler, op. cit. supra note 46, at i8o.
S Note 59 supra, at 13; note 78 supra.
82 Marx, New Interpretations of the Antitrust Law as Applied to Business, Trade, Farm
and Labor Associations, 2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 211, 222 (i928).
83 Ibid., at 217.
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"The day of the blatant trust-buster is definitely over.' '84 "Mergers, com-
bines and perhaps even monopolies are permitted and welcomed.' ' 5
But the new economic freedom soon lost its glamor. In 193o Governor
Franklin Roosevelt asked, "Are we in danger of the creation in these
United States of such a highly centralized industrial control that we may
have to bring forth a new Declaration of Independence?"86 When the de-
pression came it was recognized that artificial price rigidity, the mark of
monopoly or effective trade restrictions, had played its part. Thomas La-
mont in i93o was quoted as attributing the world-wide depression "in
part to the effort made in many parts of the world to hold up commodity
prices artificially, whether in rubber, cotton, wheat, coffee, copper or
what not. When prices for such commodities finally gave way, the severity
of the business collapse was accentuated." 87 During the depression, rigid
price behavior made readjustment and recovery difficult. "In the depres-
sion, there was a general tendency, though with many exceptions, for the
industries whose sales dropped most to show relatively little price adjust-
ment, while in the industries in which a major price readjustment took
place, there was a tendency for consumption to drop the least. Likewise, in
the recovery period, the industries whose sales were increasing most
showed little price rise while those with the least rise in sales showed the
greatest rise in price.'"9 There was and there is substantial evidence of
artificial price rigidity not only through statistics showing the behavior
of prices over a period of time in the face of changing conditions, 9 but
through the more specific evidence of identical bids.9o
The effect of such price rigidities was to further economic maladjust-
ment. "For example, prices received by the farmer during the depression
showed the greatest sensitivity and fell, as a whole, about 57 per cent, and
grains about 64 per cent, while agricultural implements declined les; than
17 per cent as a maximum, and for most of the years only 5 or 6 per cent."9' x
Somewhat the same relationship existed between prices and wages in
84 Tbid., at 223.
ss Schmidt, The Changing Economics of the Supreme Court, x67 Annals 61 (1936).
86 Barrett, The True and Limited Function of Antitrust Statutes, x67 Annals 27 (I930).
57 Fetter, The Masquerade of Monopoly 399 (ig3i).
88 Note 54 supra, at 14o.
59 Note 5o supra, at 3o2-304.
90 Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised? 71 U.S. L. Rev. 575, 578 (1937); Jack-
son and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 231, 240-41 (1938);
Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, op. cit. supra note So, at 300-302.
9* Jackson, op. cit. supra note go, at 578.
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the centralized industries. As Robert Jackson, then of the Department
of Justice, reported in the United States Law Review, "If rigid prices
meant stability of employment in the industry, we would find price con-
trol more tolerable. But generally, the more rigid and inflexible the price
of a product during the depression, the more calamitous was the decline in
its labor's payroll. .... Payrolls for the iron and steel industries declined
about 75 per cent while the wholesale price of ingots declined only 16 per
cent. The depression prices of cast iron pipe declined 7 per cent and pay-
rolls declined 74 per cent. While agricultural implements declined i4 per
cent in price, the industry's payrolls took the price decline of 83 per cent.
Virgin aluminum went down 21 per cent in price and payrolls of aluminum
manufacturers declined about 70 per cent. Cement declined 13 per cent
and its payrolls 72 per cent."'92 This was not the situation in the industries
which were more competitive.
Concentration and price rigidity had its effect on consumer purchasing
power.
As a result of the depression there was more general acceptance of the
doctrine that "No amount of monetary stabilization or stimulation can
make an economy function better or tolerably as it becomes increasingly
monopolized and syndicalized. Restrictive measures, widely applied,
must add up to serious aggregate restrictions, to unemployment, and to a
stagnant or contracting economy."93
Yet today we are in the middle of what appears to be another giant
merger movement. "Almost every successful business enterprise is con-
92 Jackson, op. cit. supra note 90, at 578-79. In general it appears that wage rates in the
concentrated industries declined less than wage rates in other industries; nevertheless, it
appears that there was a greater decrease in total amounts paid to labor in the concentrated
industries because production was more curtailed. Again, it can be urged that labor benefited
from a greater expansion in production in the concentrated industries after the depression.
The point is not one of unusual disparity between price and wage changes, nor between in-
come and total wage payments, but rather that concentration cannot be justified upon the
basis that concentration cushions the shock of depression on labor. Taking industries by
groups, with Group A as the most concentrated and Group E as the least, the percentage of
price and production declines and increases appears to be as follows:
DEcLrNE, 1929-32 INCREASE, 1929-35
GR~up
Price Production Price Production
A .................. 9.4 2.6  2.0 81.0
B .................. 18.7 .32.8 6.9 26.S
C .................. 28.2 45.7 S.S 46.8
D ................. 37.9 38.7 25.0 32.2
E .................. 53.4 -0.4 S5.7 -5.9
National Resources Comm., The Structure of the American Economy 148 (1939).
93 Simons, Economic Stability and Antitrust Policy, ii Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 338, 345 (i944).
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stantly offered opportunities to buy other businesses. ' ' 94 During the war
years 832 acquisitions occurred. 95 Preliminary figures for 1946 show that
8o acquisitions occurred during the first quarter of the year-more than
have occurred in any year since 19316 In 1945, 295 acquisitions occurred
-more than any year since 1931. As a part of this movement, 97 the three
largest liquor companies, in an industry already showing great concen-
tration, acquired twenty-two distilleries, six wineries, one brewery, one
cooperage firm and one carbonated water concern. One company in the
drug and pharmaceutical industry-American Home Products-made
thirty-one acquisitions between i94o and 1945. The sometimes-said-to-be-
related Sterling Drug, Inc., acquired ten companies. Seven of the largest
steel corporations bought out more than thirty-five smaller companies be-
tween i94o and 1945. United States Steel has entered the prefabricated
housing field through its acquisition of Gunnison Housing Corporation.
The Continental Can Co. acquired eight concerns. General Electric con-
tinues to expand with the purchase of Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp. Gen-
eral Foods bought the Wilmington Packing Co. and the coffee business
of the Paton Corp. In all it had at least nine acquistions. Lever Brothers
purchased the Pepsodent Co.-thus completing the entrance of the three
big soap companies into the dertal preparations field. The Safeway chain
store company acquired three grocery chains. In chemicals, American
Cyanamid acquired two, Du Pont three, and Monsanto five corporations.
In the dairy industry, the Borden Co. added nine concerns. In banking,
the TransAmerica Corp. acquired fourteen other banks.
III
Against this amount of concentration and the strength of the move-
ment, one may wonder whether the Sherman Act will survive. Yet the
act has survived despite constant attacks from the right and the left and
has shown amazing vitality.98 It is quite probable that the Sherman Act
'94 Note 69 supra, at 22.
9s Note 69 supra, at 66. 96 Note 77 supra.
97 The specific acquisitions are set forth in Hearings on H.R. 2357, Op. cit. supra note 69,
and in Economic Concentration in World War II, op. cit. supra note 59.
98 Montague, Proposals for the Revision of the Antitrust Laws, in Handler, The Federal
Antitrust Laws 23, 62 (1932): "One of the peculiarities of the Sherman Act is the frequency
with which, under expanding interpretations of the Supreme Court, the Act has successively
been found to be amply effective to accomplish one after another of most of the things that
economists, publicists, and even several presidents of the United States at one time or another
have assumed were quite beyond the scope of the Act.
"Another peculiarity of the Act is that its periods of greatest growth have always imme-
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has at last grown to meet the situation, or possibly has returned to its
original purpose.
One result of the Steel and the Harvester cases was to bring the act un-
der constant attack because of the dichotomy between the closely knit
combination cases or integrated cases, and the loose combination or ordi-
nary restraint of trade cases.99 If percentage of control was to be consid-
ered, it was startling that trade associations representing 30 per cent of an
industry, for example, should be prevented in the American Column and
Lumber case from taking steps which one corporation having 50 per cent
control could take. 0 It was suggested that the rigorous application of the
act in the restraint of trade cases was forcing many companies into merg-
ers and combinations."'' For a time it looked as though there might be
some relaxation of the law in the restraint of trade cases. The Appalachian
Coals case"' marks the bulge. Together with the Steel case, the Appala-
chian Coals case marks a trip into cartel territory. If the trend had con-
tinued, it seems probable that we would have had a cartel commission or
at least a regulating commission in this country. As it was we came rather
close to it in the NRA. The analogy between those cases and European
cases marking the trip away from a liberal economic tradition by opening
the door to a justification of price fixing and restrictive practices is very
marked X0 3 But apparently the Appalachian Coals case was only a bulge.
As a matter of fact the Sherman Act has become increasingly clear in
diately followed the periods when its critics have been most firmly convinced that the Act
is hopelessly inadequate.
"History shows that the Sherman Act marches best and furthest to meet the changing
conditions of economic life after it has been prodded and goaded by sincere critics who have
become convinced that the Act has reached an impasse." Ibid., at 62.
99 Dr. Thorp in Part i TNEC Hearings 112 (1938); Hardy, Loose and Consolidated Com-
binations under the Antitrust Laws, 21 Geo. L. J. 123, 144 (933); Jaffe and Tobringer, The
Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164 (1932); Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 32 Col. L. Rev. 179 (1932); Levy, The Sherman Act Is
Outworn, It Should Be Amended, 13 Va. L. Rev. 597 (1927).
zoo See the dissent of Mr. justice Brandeis in American Column and Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377, 413-19 (X922).
lox Ibid.; Dr. Thorp in Part i TNEC Hearings 112 (1938); Arnold in Part i TNEC Hear-
ings 113 (1938): "Isn't it perfectly true that the lack of the application of the Sherman Act
to new situations has certainly contributed in this case rather than the Sherman Act, itself,
has?"
x- Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); see Rostow, Bituminous
Coal and the Public Interest, 5o Yale L.J. 543 (1941); Hamilton, Coal and the Economy-A
Demurrer, So Yale L. J. 595 (4941).
103 Wolf, Business Monopolies: Three European Systems in Their Bearing on American
Law, 9 Tulane L. Rev. 325 (1935); Kronstein and Leighton, Cartel Control: a Record of
Failure, 55 Yale L.J. 297 (1946). Cf. Kronstein, Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents,
9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 643 (1942), io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 49 (1942).
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the restraint of trade cases. In the Madison Oil case 04 it became almost
perfectly clear that a pricing agreement could not be justified by reference
to ruinous market conditions. And in the Fashion Originators' Guild
case,1 s5 it became clear that boycott or coercion could not be justified by
explaining the reasonableness of the practice as a means of stopping de-
sign piracy. Today one can almost say that price fixing, coercion or divi-
sion of territories"'6 are in themselves illegal under the Sherman Act.
The Madison Oil case was a very interesting case to carry the clarifica-
tion of the law in the loose combination cases, for it was not a typical price
fixing case at all. The conspiracy was a conspiracy to remove distress
gasoline from the market. If a combination to remove an oversupply (from
the standpoint of those co-operating) could be illegal without regard for
its reasonableness, then it would seem as though one company dominating
the market to an amount equal to the combination might well be illegal.
But Mr. Justice Douglas does not make the transition; instead he some-
what carefully points out that the rule of reason has no application to a
price fixing case.0 7
The gap between the restraint of trade cases and the close combination
or monopoly cases, however, has been considerably narrowed. This was
done in the Alcoa case."'° The Alcoa case was prevented from-being a typi-
cal monopoly abuse case by the findings of fact of the lower court judge. A
reversal of these findings would have been an almost impossible work for
an appellate court to have performed. Under these circumstances, the
Alcoa case comes near to being a holding that size alone is the offense. To
be sure there was great size and a great percentage of control, and in addi-
tion, as the court points out, in the past there had been some abuse of
power. The decision could rest on what judge Hand termed the gloss of
Mr. justice Cardozo in the Swift case0 9 where power once abused becomes
104 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3io U.S. 150 (1940), noted in 49 Yale L. J. 761
(1940).
os Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (194x).
,o6United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (C.C.A. 6th, 1898); United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (N.Y., 1945); United States v. Aluminum
Co., 148 F. 2d 46, 443 (C.C.A. 2d, x945); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F.
Supp. 642 (N.Y., 1944).
107 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3io U.S. 150, 214 (i94o): "As clearly indi-
cated in the Trenton Potteries case, the American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases have no
application to combinations operating directly on price or price structures."
zoo United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
lo9 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. io6, ii6 (1932): "Mere size, according to the
holding of this court, is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point
at which it amounts to a monopoly, but size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is
not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past."
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illegal as a continual threat. It could also rest on the words of Mr. Justice
Cardozo because Judge Hand was willing to say that Alcoa was a monop-
oly. It was a monopoly because it had 90 per cent control. Judge Hand ex-
pressed himself as uncertain as to what the result would have been if the
percentage had been lower.
But the decision does much more than declare what presumably any
economist knows-namely that the example of a monopoly in American
industry is a monopoly. Quite intentionally, it would appear, the decision
brings the monopoly and the restraint of trade cases closer together. The
opinion reads:
Starting, however, with the authoritative premise that all contracts fixing prices are
unconditionally prohibited, the only possible difference between them and a monopoly
is that while a monopoly necessarily involves an equal, or even greater, power to fix
prices, its mere existence might be thought not to constitute an exercise of that power.
That distinction is nevertheless purely formal; it would be valid only so long as the
monopoly remained wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as the monopoly began to
operate; for, when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell at some
price and the only price at which it could sell is a price which it itself fixed. Thereafter
the power and its exercise must needs coalesce. Indeed it would be absurd to condemn
such contracts unconditionally, and not to extend the condemnation to monopolies;
for the contracts are only steps toward that entire control which monopoly confers:
they are really partial monopoliesx1 °
This does not mean of course that the percentage operative in a price
fixing case as sufficient to give market control will be a sufficient percent-
age for a monopolization case. A specific intent to monopolize, which was
not required in the Alcoa. case, since a monopoly was found, might be a
substitute when the percentage of control is not sufficiently high. But in
its treatment of the monopoly problem the Alcoa court has focussed atten-
tion either on the intention to monopolize, where there is a plan and an at-
tempt to do so, or on the percentage of control over the industry. It is to
be noted that the Supreme Court has taken particular pains to give its ap-
proval to the Alcoa case.",' It may be thai the courts have passed from the
abuse theory to a recognition that size and power are themselves the
abuse.
At the same time it appears to be increasingly clear, despite the doubt
expressed in the Alcoa case, that the percentage of control as a practical
matter in most cases would not have to be anything like as high as the
9o per cent in the Alcoa case. There are two reasons for this. In the first
place the area as to which the percentage is to be determined can be nar-
210 United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F. 2d 4x6, 427-28 (C.C.A. 2d, x45).
"I American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 665 S. Ct. 1125, 1140 (1946).'
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rowed. Not only was the percentage in the Farmer's Guide for example not
as high as 70 per cent and perhaps no higher than 4o per cent, but if the
whole United States had been taken into account the percentage would
have fallen to something like 15 per cent."' The court was willing to nar-
row the area to those states in which the defendant conducted his busi-
ness. Other monopolization cases show us that the area can be limited.
The area was limited in the Crescent case" 3 where a local motion picture ex-
hibition circuit was held to have combined to monopolize. In Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.," 4 the monopolization was the
refusal to sell supplies to a local photographic stock house, although it is
true that this refusal was part of a general plan. In the St. Louis Terminal
case," 5 of course, the area was clearly local. In the Klearflax case," 6 a dis-
trict court found an illegal attempt to monopolize in the refusal of the
manufacturer of linen rugs to permit any purchaser, and one in particular,
to take away from it the sole right to supply the United States govern-
ment.
Because it is clear that monopolization may be achieved in a local area,
the position taken by the Attorney General in permitting the acquisition
by United States Steel Corporation of the Geneva Steel plant seems ques-
tionable."' Geneva Steel, with ingot capacity of 1,28o,0oo tons, has the
largest capacity on the West Coast. The Attorney General was apparently
influenced by the small percentage of total ingot steel capacity possessed
by the United States Steel Corporation. It has 3L4 per cent of the na-
tional capacity. Even with the acquisition of Geneva, it has only 39 per
cent of the total ingot capacity on the West Coast."' But an entirely dif-
ferent picture is presented if one looks at the West Coast capacity for
112 Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing -Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268
(1934).
113 United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (i944).
"4 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
"'5 United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
:Z6United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 33 (Minn., 1945): ....
it appears that the total amount of Klearflax's annual production .... is less than one-
half of one per cent of the total rug business in the entire Nation."
X17 Letter to General E. B. Gregory, Administrator, War Assets Administration (June 17,
1946).
1,8 Ibid.: "I have also considered certain statistics regarding the capacity of the steel in-
dustry in the Far West. These statistics show that the Far West, exclusive of Geneva, has
aggregate annual capacity of approximately 3,619,000 tons, or 17.3%. Total far western
capacity, including Geneva, amounts to approximately 4,900,000 tons. If United States Steel
Corporation acquires the Geneva Plant, it would have 1,gi,ooo tons, or 39% of the total
capacity of the Far West. The total western capacity, however, amounts only to approxi-
mately 5.3% of the total capacity of the steel industry in the United States."
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specific items. The most important item made at Geneva under United
States Steel will be hot roll coils for tin plate. United States Steel Corpora-
tion is the largest seller of tin plate, and it, together with three other com-
panies, has accounted for two-thirds of the tin plate producing capacity.
On the West Coast it has all the tin plate capacity. With the acquisition
of Geneva, United States Steel has ioo per cent of Western Production of
tin plates, hot rolled sheet and hot rolled strips." 9
The second reason is somewhat more interesting. As has been indicated
the pattern for many American industries is control by a few companies
over a substantial portion of the output. It would appear probable that
where such control exists, perhaps in most cases, there is an illegal con-
cert of action among the companies. Together their percentage of control
is probably sufficiently high to spell illegality, and in any event it would be
sufficiently high to give credence to a charge of an attempt to monopolize
or of a combination or conspiracy to monopolize. This seems in any event
to be the direction in which the law is moving, and it is a necessary de-
velopment if anything is to be done about the increasing concentration in
American industry.
It has been known for some time, of course, that an express agreement
is not required in order to support a charge of combination or conspiracy
in an antitrust case. The phrase "concert of action" has become some-
thing of a substitute for the agreement concept. 20 In the Interstate Circuit
case,'' the Court was quite clear that no agreement was required. Knowl-
edge of a general plan and action on it were all that were required.122 In
the Socony case"13 participation in a general buying program constituted
the heart of the arrangement. In the last Paramount case,'2 4 it was uni-
"19 See Western Steel Plate and the.Tin-Plate Industry, S. Doc. 95, 79th Cong. ist Sess.
(x945); Berge, Economic Freedom for the West 24 (r946).
12* This seems to be so despite United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 44 F. Supp. 949 (I1.,
1942), appeal dismissed, 317 U.S. 200 (1942).
12 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 3o6 U.S. 208 (i939).
h Ibid., at 226: "While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors
among themselves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the circumstances of this
case such agreement for the imposition of the restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors was
not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing the concerted action
was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and par-
ticipated in it." Ibid., at 227: "Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an
invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is re-
straint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act." Cf. the argument for the appellants at 212.
"3 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 15o (1940).
24 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 337, 339 (N.Y., 1946). See
also Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, Inc., ixo F. 2d 738, 743 (C.C.A. 3d, 1945); United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
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formity of action which "spells a deliberately unlawful system." In the
latest and second American Tobacco case,25 the jury was permitted to find
a combination and conspiracy to acquire and maintain the power to ex-
clude competitors. The evidence was the evidence of common action, as
for example, that when dealers received an announcement of a price in-
crease from one competitor, other competitors refused to fill orders until
they likewise raised their prices.116 There was no direct evidence of any
agreement. Concert of action to exclude others, even though no proof of
actual exclusion was required, was sufficient.
In some ways the second American Tobacco case applies the Alcoa case,
which it praises, to the domination-by-a-few type case. The Supreme
Court was careful to point out in the tobacco case that it did not have be-
fore it the problem of the Alcoa case in that a combination and conspiracy
had been charged. But in its determination that no actual exclusion need
be shown and its emphasis on the power of the combination, the Tobacco
case, like the Alcoa case moves away from the abuse theory to the size or
power theory. The barrier placed against newcomers because ofthe adver-
tising expenditures of the defendants is specifically mentioned, not as an
abuse but as an illustration of the power of the combination.1 2 7 It is true,
of course, that the jury found a combination and conspiracy. And it may
be that the courts have now made of this area something analogous to the
resale price maintenance case where companies may walk the wavering
line between permitted suggestions and unlawful agreements. But the
Interstate Circuit case makes it clear that common activities engaged in
with knowledge, will join all in the conspiracy, and no agreement for this
purpose is required.
There would appear to be good reasons why the outsider should be pro-
tected against the power of a combination participated in by a few com-
panies with majority control over an industry. The success of such a com-
bination in competition with an outsider cannot be said to have resulted
from the skill of the individual enterpriser, as the court states in the
Associated Press caseY.28 This is similar to the problem of dealing with the
125 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 1125 (1946).
126 Ibid., at 138. Or, for example, that "petitioners refused to purchase tobacco on these
markets unless the other petitioners were also represented thereon." Ibid., at 1135.
=7 "In each of the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, American, Liggett and Reynolds expended
a total of over $4ooooooo a year for advertising. Such advertising is not here criticized as a
business expense ..... Such tremendous advertising, however, is also a widely published
warning that these companies possess and know how to use a powerful offensive and de-
fensive weapon against new competition." Ibid., at 1133.
-8 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, IS (1945): "The Sherman Act was spe-
cifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common
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integrated company. The integrated company and the company in com-
bination may not use power to force all others into a similar pattern or,
by excluding them, force them out of the industry. The trend reflected in
the Associated Press case is somewhat analogous to the decision of Thur-
man Arnold in Potts v. Coex2 dealing with the award of patents. It is the
problem of whether the individual enterpriser is to be rewarded or whether
the reward is to go to those who work only in combination and only by
means of combination have succeeded.
The spelling out of an unlawful combination and conspiracy to monopo-
lize from concert of action and by common practices is continued in the
last Paramount case. This would appear to be the theory to justify nu-
merous cases. It would for example justify the government's case against
the twenty-odd major oil companies if the alleged common practices exist
in that industry.130 Here the outsider is at a decided disadvantage without
ownership of pipelines, barred by restrictive arrangements, if the charges
are correct, from access to the market, and kept out of a type of banking
system by which gasoline is exchanged among the majors in order to avoid
the expense of shipment.
The integration cases probably will not move into the siie and power
classification and away from the abuse theory so easily. The integration
plan which is bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which
the groups compete. Victory of a member of such a combination over its business rivals
achieved by such collective means cannot consistently with the Sherman Act or with prac-
tical, everyday knowledge be attributed to individual 'enterprise and sagacity'; such ham-
pering of business rivals can only be attributed to that which really makes it possible-the
collective power of an unlawful combination." Cf. United States v. New York Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 677 (ILl, 2946).
-9 14o F. 2d 470, 474 (App. D.C., i944).
130 United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil Action No. 8524, pending in.the
District of Columbia. It has been reported that the Department of Justice might abandon
this suit in favor of a series of separate actions. Such a step would appear to ignore both
the trend of the cases and the economic situation which is alleged to exist. The complaint
itself set forth the theory of an illegal combination of dominant companies. A paragraph of
the complaint reads:
"Each of the integrated companies is a large combination of capital and individuals pos-
sessing great economic power, including the power to handicap or even stifle effective compe-
tition by the non-integrated companies. Moreover, all of these integrated companies operate
in effect as one unit under substantially identical business policies and practices. Through
the control of oil reserves, wells, transportation and marketing facilities, the twenty-two
companies have been able to restrict the production of independent producers, exclude inde-
pendents from the use of transportation and marketing facilities and fix the price of pe-
troleum and its products. In an attempt to prevent such restraints, the government has
successfully prosecuted numerous actions against the majors. However, such piecemeal
prosecutions have not resulted in the restoration of free competition or prevented the recur-
rence of such arrangements because the power inherent in the combinations continued to
exist."
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problem has been present in a surprising number of cases, as for example
Standard Oil, Swift, International Harvester, General Motors I3' and Pull-
man.132 Where there is ioo per cent control, as was the case in Pullman, it
would seem that today a court might take the step not taken in the
Pullman case and declare the integration to be an illegal monopolization
without more. Usually in an integration case, however, the effort is made
to use ownership of one part of an hidustry to dominate another part-at
least that is what separates the integration case from the straight monopo-
lization case. Here an intent to monopolize may have to be found, and
may well be found only in a plan recognized as such because of restrictive
arrangements, price cutting or fraud-the earmarks of the abuse cate-
gory. The problem is, or probably will be, dramatically presented in the
chain store cases where percentage of control over an industry is low-if,
for example, 25 per cent is low, and where it seems quixotic to find il-
legality based on what appear to be trivial abuses.' 33 To base illegality on
such abuses appears to be an indirect way of talking about the vice of
integration. The case one has in mind, for example, is the Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company case. 3 4 The evidence presented in the opinion of the
court is convincing as to abuses. One wonders if the abuses are required or
whether the structure itself will always produce abuses of that order. 35
One may guess also.that there will be a change in the patent monopo-
lization cases. The Hartford case 36 suggests a form of relief for such cases
reminiscent of the St. Louis Terminal case. It is not at all clear that such
relief is adequate. Such relief sanctions illegal practices of the most
dangerous type by making the abuse of a patent profitable not only up
to the very day that a decree becomes effective but also by preserving in
the form of reasonable royalty the advantage which has been obtained by
the combination of patent monopolies. A somewhat more automatic and
effective relief may operate, however, if the implication of the patent
131 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.C.A. 7th, 194).
132 United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (Pa., 1943).
133 Cf. 6o Pol. Sci. Q. 577 ('945).
'-4 United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (Ill.,1944).
"S' "It is easy to make such excuses with plausibility when a business is so huge," Mr.
Justice Cardozo in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. io6, ii8 (1932).
136 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). The relief was compulsory
licensing under abused patents. Cf. Mr. Brandeis' testimony b6fore the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, op. cit. supra note 29, at 1266: "Now, if a decree of dissolution should
be entered, or a decree entered declaring the defendant guilty of violating the law, and result-
ing in injunctions of one kind or another, there ought to be express power in the court to
declare invalid a patent used for an illegal purpose."
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abuse cases is carried out. It is illegal to tie one patent to another.37 If
this is so, then it would appear to be illegal to grant a license under one
patent conditioned upon the licensee taking a license under another
patent. The Paramount case adopts this view of the law in connection with
patents and makes it effective as to copyrights.,' 8 It thus appears that
patent pools in the future cannot be built on a structure where a license to
the pool is all that is allowed, but presumably if any license is offered, then
the licensee must be permitted, if he desires, to obtain a license to any
single patent x39
IV
Up to the present time the antitrust laws have not been successful in the
monopolization field. That is to say, not only has concentration of indus-
try not been prevented but the trend toward greater concentration con-
tinues. It must be admitted further that the interpretations of the Alcoa
and Tobacco cases are problematical. It may well be that the Sherman Act
will finally prove to be an insufficient instrument to handle so important a
problem of the economy. It is not that a great amount of concentration is
not possible, nor that the Sherman Act must require all that is possible.
An act which would keep concentration from becoming more excessive and
yet not make for more competition might be much more compatible with
democracy than a measure creating some control over industry.
For most of the history of the Sherman Act such controls have been
suggested. The suggestions come from both the right and the left. At one
extreme is the suggestion that a commission be authorized to regulate
monopolies by power to fix prices when necessary and authorized to per-
mit reasonable agreements. That in effect was the suggestion of Judge
X37 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1939); see Mercoid Corp. v.
Honeywell Co., 320 U.S. 68o (1944). In Stokes & Smith v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp.,
156 F. 2d 198 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946), it was held that an agreement to assign improvement
patents tied to a license was an illegal agreement. Under the particular facts of the case the
court stressed the situation which the licensee would be in after the assignment. His situation
would be that he would have to get another license to continue in business and this was illegal
as tying one license to another. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
reversed, x5. L.W. 4184 (Feb. 3, 1947), but on the ground that it was not illegal per se to
require the assignment of patent rights in return for a license. The Supreme Court, therefore,
did not treat the case as one equivalent to the tying of one patent to another. Nevertheless,
the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Transparent-Wrap case, at 4186, "A patent is a
species of property," is to be compared with the language of the Justice in his dissenting
opinion in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (1944), "It is a mistake therefore
to conceive of a patent as but another form of private property."
138 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 349-50 (N.Y., 1946).
139 Presumably the penalty will be inability to sue upon the patents until "the conse-
quences of that practice have been fully dissipated," B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S.
495, 498 (1942).
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Gary in 1912.140 Another type of suggestion is to have either federal
licensing or federal incorporation. Both of these were urged in 1912 also.' 4'
These are of course only devices. They might work by imposing a limita-
tion on the size of corporations, their right to hold stock in other corpora-
tions, or they might spell out specific practices which would be illegal. As a
matter of fact it is rare that some such proposal is not before some con-
gressional committee. Usually proposals to strengthen the antitrust laws
in effect are coupled with proposals to weaken them at the same time-as
the proposal to increase the power of the Federal Trade Commission to
cover asset acquisitions is coupled with a procedure for finding acquisitions
to be legal and barring prosecution. 42 Usually such proposals also involve
some action by some commission, new or old. It seems a good guess that
unless the Sherman Act is more effective in monopolization cases than it
has been-that is to say in economic effect-some such legislation will
pass. The prediction is hazardous because a depression will probably bring
in another NRA in any event.
But if the Sherman Act is to be made effective in monopolization cases,
something must be done about the relief secured from the courts. The
position taken by the court in the last Paranount case is illustrative. The
court found an illegal combination and conspiracy to restrain and monop-
olize. It refused to grant divestiture of the motion picture theaters from
the owner producers. It did so even though it stated that in 4o per cent of
the cities having ioo,ooo or more persons, the five defendants had no com-
petition in first-run houses. It stated that it could not grant divestiture
because the five majors could not be treated collectively to support a
charge of monopolization. Yet in specific areas such monopolization had
been achieved. There is no merit in the ceremony of finding a violation
unless something like adequate relief is to be granted. The courts have
consistently underestimated the requirements for adequate relief. It is
not that atomization is desired. It is silly to speak of atomization in the
face 'of the units that have been preserved, as for example in the Tobacco
or in the American Can cases. 43 In this respect the courts have performed
their function with a weariness suggesting that they believe it would be
'40 Note 29 supra, at 649.
'4 Note 29 supra, at 453. '42 Note 41 supra, at 49-50.
143 An entirely different approach to the problem of relief is reflected in Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (i944): "The pattern
of past conduct is not easily forsaken. Where the proclivity for unlawful conduct has been as
manifest as here, the decree should operate as an effective deterrent to a repetition of the un-
lawful conduct and yet not stand as a barrier to healthy growth on a competitive basis."
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more appropriate for a commission to do the job.144 There is merit in not
having a commission charged with what would look like the duty of super-
vising industry. Conceivably, however, a commission might be charged
with the duty of making recommendations to a court as to the appropriate
form of relief after violation has been found. The courts have not made
use of the Federal Trade Commission for this purpose and there probably
is some merit in creating an office separate from any agency having regula-
tory functions for this purp9se. 45
The Sherman Antitrust law embodies a tradition against monopolies.
That tradition is confused. It is not clear whether we are against monopo-
lies or only against their abuses. For almost all of the history of the act, it
has been applied as a practical matter only against the abuses. This has
permitted an enormous and growing amount of concentration in economic
power. It has permitted two great merger movements-each of which
ended in a depression. We are now in the middle of a third great merger
movement. It is doubtful if a free and competitive society can be main-
tained if the direction of concentration is to continue. It is surely doubtful
whether the antitrust method of regulation will remain if it is not to be
more effective. Today, however, as a result of an increased awareness of
the monopoly problem, and as a result of the Alcoa and American Tobacco
decisions we appear to have a new interpretation of the act, closer prob-
ably to its original intention, which can give the act strength against
monopQlies a5 such, and also against control by three, four or five corpora-
tions acting together. If the concentration-problem in this country is to be
dealt with by measures themselves not incompatible with free enterprise,
it is probable that the hope lies in the new interpretation of the Sherman
Act and an increased awareness of the responsibility of the courts to give
adequate relief.
144 Cf. Mr. Justice Roberts in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 47 (i945).
14S Compare the functions of the Surplus Property Board in United States v. Aluminum Co.,
148 F. 2d 46, 446 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
